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ABSTRACT 
ii 
It is argued that dairying is vital to future viability of many small farms in East 
Africa and that high transactions costs for dairy production and marketing limit 
participation by asset- and information-poor smallholders. Case studies from Kenya 
and Ethiopia illustrate the role of dairy cooperatives in reducing transactions costs. 
Analysis of the determinants of producer prices received by a sample of dairy 
producers near Addis Ababa suggests that different levels of access to 
infrastructure, assets, and information explain why different households 
contemporaneously accept widely different producer prices for fluid milk. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
As in the rest of the developing world, increased domestic dairy production by 
smallholders has the potential in much of Africa to generate income and 
employment on a wide scale, and thus to improve the welfare of populations on an 
economically sustainable basis (Walshe et al., 1991, Winrock International, 1992). 
In peri-urban areas around the world where cattle are present, dairy typically has 
been part of the adjustment of production patterns when smallholder farmers have 
been faced with shrinking arable land, higher population density, and rising wage 
rates. Under such conditions, dairy farming may be one of the few agricultural 
activities that can provide enough income to maintain the economic viability of 
smallholder farming. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, smallholder agriculture still accounts for the majority 
of livelihoods, yet has been subjected in recent years to increasing strains as a 
viable source of income generation. Nevertheless, it is striking that smallholder 
peri-urban dairy development has not been widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa 
outside of the East African highlands, particularly given the importance of livestock 
in African farming systems. 
This paper will attempt to apply insights from the New Institutional Economics 
to investigate a key issue of public policy for African countries, which are searching 
for ways to promote the inclusion of large numbers of smallholder farmers in the 
benefits offered by structural adjustment policies, even as they bear the costs of 
adjustment out of previously subsidized activities that are no long viable at the farm 
level. The paper will first argue that in peri-urban areas of Africa (150 km or less 
from the capital city) where cattle already are kept, dairy offers high potential as a 
smallholder diversification activity. In such areas, dairy is technically feasible, yet 
typically not widespread, and recent and on-going structural changes are improving 
its profitability. 
Second, the paper hypothesizes that growth in smallholder dairying is limited 
by especially high transactions costs for both production and marketing of dairy 
products by smallholder farmers in Africa. Understanding the nature of these 
constraints and how they can be alleviated is central to using dairy development as 
a tool to improve rural livelihoods in peri-urban areas. In African economies that are 
only partly commercialized, smallholder farmers are likely to face higher 
transactions costs than larger producers. These may result from inadequate access 
to market information, for example, needed to enter into new activities that structural 
change has rendered profitable on paper. Transactions costs thus help explain why 
aggregate agricultural supply response to relative price changes is often quite slow 
in Africa (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1992; Delgado, 1995). 
Third, the paper hypothesizes that differential levels of transactions costs 
across producers in what appears on the surface to be a single "market" (Le fluid 
milk in Addis Ababa at time t) explains why producers habitually accept widely 
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different prices for a seemingly homogenous good in the same location and time 
period. A variety of market outlets for milk exist, different producers supply different 
outlets, and some producers supply several different ones simultaneously at 
different prices. 
Fourth, the paper argues that producer-level institutions such as cooperatives 
and contracts with buyers playa central role in reducing transactions costs where 
market dairy activity is observed. Indigenous institutions and organizations1 typically 
have evolved to reduce the costs of transactions among agents in the dairy 
marketing chain. It is vital to better document the nature of these institutions and 
organizations, and to study if alternatives need to be encouraged to promote dairy 
development. 
These assertions will be investigated in case studies for Kenya and Ethiopia, 
where smallholder dairy is much more prevalent than in the rest of Africa. The 
highland climate in Kenya and Ethiopia is relatively favorable to grade dairy cattle 
crossed with indigenous stock. This in part explains the development of dairy in 
general and smallholder dairying in particular in those zones. However, the role of 
institutional and other policy factors in supporting smallholder livestock development 
in Kenya has been key, and the role of economic liberalization is currently affecting 
that development in both Kenya and Ethiopia. 
II. A NEW ERA FOR DAIRY IN AFRICA? 
Dairy production added roughly $2 billion to Africa's GDP at the end of the 
1980's, and probably more at today's much higher world prices (Walshe et al., 
1991). More than 7 million metric tons of milk were produced annually in the late 
1980's (Table 1) in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, excluding South Africa. Per capita 
consumption of dairy products has been estimated at 27 kg per year (Table 1). 
The well-known bias in trade and macroeconomic policies against agriculture 
in Africa in the second half of the 1970's and the first half of the 
1 For our purposes, institutions are defined as the rules and expectations governing 
exchanges, and organizations are defined as formal or informal groupings of 
economic agents. 
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Table 1: Selected Characteristics of the Dairy Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Region Milking Total Cow's Production per Imports per 
Cows Milk Production capita (kg all capitab(kg) 
(000) (000 MT) dairy productsa) 
1988 1988 1970 1987 1970 1987 
Eastern 14,468 4,959 59.1 53.8 1.2 2.3 
Kenya 2,255 1,015 50.3 0.2 
Ethiopia 3,875 815 21.9 1.7 
Tanzania 2,800 378 20.5 0.9 
Uganda 1,080 448 22.4 1.0 
Western 4,496 1,071 14.3 8.1 3.7 5.1 
Nigeria 1,220 360 3.5 1.9 
SouthernC 1,669 720 20.0 13.0 5.0 6.2 
Zimbabwe 143 225 24.9 0.5 
Central 669 311 7.1 4.8 2.0 4.4 
Angola 295 148 16.1 14.9 
Total 21,302 7,061 27.0 22.2 2.8 4.3 
alncludes cow, sheep, and goat milk. 
bBased on liquid milk equivalents. 
cExcludes South Africa. 
Sources: Walshe, et al. (1991) and ILeA (1993), various tables, using FAO data. 
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1980's was continued for livestock products well into the 1990's, particularly in 
West Africa (Williams, 1993). This occurred despite meaningful policy reforms 
in the second half of the 1980's affecting agricultural incentives as a whole. This 
differential effect for livestock products was due in no small part to the availability 
of heavily subsidized low grade frozen meat, milk powder and butter oil from 
developed countries. Besides the usual impediments to internal agricultural trade 
in sub-Saharan Africa (such as official and unofficial taxation), small-scale peri­
urban dairy producers also have had to contend with poor infrastructure for handling 
perishable produce, and parastatal milk collection systems which passed on much 
of their excessive costs to producers, or used their market power to squeeze 
producer profits (Staal and Shapiro, 1994). 
The economic and political environment for growth in many countries of sub­
Saharan Africa has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s. Modifications to 
domestic and external policies are likely to have improved the incentives for 
domestic agricultural production in general, and dairy production in particular. 
Structural adjustment programs have wrought changes in agricultural sector, trade, 
and exchange-rate policies. These economic changes have improved the financial 
profitability of the peri-urban dairy production systems in some countries, such as 
Kenya (Staal, 1995; Staal and Shapiro, 1994; Williams, 1993), although this 
remains to be established in others. Domestic resource cost (DRC) analysis in 
Kenya, for example, shows that Kenya holds a strong comparative advantage in 
dairying with respect to world markets (Staal 1995). 
Countries of the North have become more sensitive to the impact of their 
surplus management policies on the poorer countries of the South. International 
trade liberalization, such as reform of the European Union's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and the GATT agreement, changes in US dairy policy, and the 
reduction of subsidies on dairy exports from Western Europe, are all expected to 
reduce world milk surpluses. Further, these reductions have not been offset by a 
flood of exports once expected from the liberalization of the former CIS and Eastern 
European economies. Policies in Europe and the U.S. were largely responsible for 
the world price of skim-milk powder falling to $600/metric ton in 1985, rising to 
$2,000 in early 1989, and falling to $1,300 in 1990 (Nell, 1992). Currently, the price 
is well above $2,000 and projections are that world market prices for dairy products 
will not decline substantially in the near future (FAD, 1994). To the extent that 
exchange rate reform and trade liberalization allow higher international prices to be 
expressed domestically, incentives for domestic dairy production are likely to be 
improving. 
Further improvements in incentives for domestic dairy production are also 
likely in coming years due to rapidly growing and increasingly urban populations. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, per capita dairy product demand grew about 2 percent per 
annum over the 1960's and 1970's, then stagnated during the 1980's (Walshe et al., 
1991, Winrock International, 1992; Rosegrant, Agacaoili-Sombilla, and Perez 1995). 
Dairy imports in Sub-Saharan Africa grew from 2.3 kg/capita in 1970 to 4.3 
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kg.lcapita in 1987. Higher world market prices and domestic policy reform may 
enable local dairy producers to lessen the gap between domestic production and 
consumption. 
Dairy production by smallholders in several peri-urban areas of Africa does 
appear to be growing in response to changes in the economic environment, 
although response rates appear to vary across regions and types of producers 
(Brokken and Seyoum, 1992; Shapiro et al., 1995). Smallholders, however, may 
be having greater difficulty than larger commercial farmers in profiting from the new 
opportunities. Smallholder dairy production and marketing in Africa appear to have 
been limited by transactions costs and the inadequacy of the institutions and 
organizations governing exchanges of raw milk and home-produced dairy products 
to deal with them. 
III.	 TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND SMALLHOLDER RESPONSIVENESS TO 
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT FOR DAIRY 
The notion that the costs of arranging exchange may reduce or even prevent 
exchanges from occurring, and may give rise to institutions and organizations to 
offset their negative impacts, is now widely accepted (Williamson, 1985; Bardhan, 
1989; De Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991; Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz, 
1995; Jaffee, 1995). Transactions costs include, inter alia, the costs of searching 
for a partner with whom to exchange, screening potential trading partners to 
ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential trading partners (and, in 
some cases, officials who can hold up trade) to reach an agreement, transferring 
the product (this typically involves transportation, processing, packaging, and 
securing title, if necessary), monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are 
fulfilled, and enforcing (or seeking damages for any violation of) the exchange 
agreement. 
A.	 Milk as a Commodity Subject to High Transactions Costs 
The nature of milk and its derivatives in part explains the transactions costs 
associated with exchanges of dairy products. First, raw milk is highly perishable, 
and thus requires rapid transportation to consumption centers or for processing into 
less perishable forms. This may limit marketing options for small and remote dairy 
producers, and implies greater losses due to spoilage than for commodities such 
as grains. Because milk production typically is a year-round activity, dairy producers 
often must be concerned with maintaining outlets for their production. The search 
for stable market outlets by producers is complicated by what is often significant 
seasonal variation in milk production and dairy product consumption (Jaffee, 1995; 
Debrah and Anteneh, 1991). 
In addition, raw milk is a "bulky" commodity. Raw milk is typically more than 
85 percent water, implying relatively high transportation costs per unit, and limiting 
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the quantities that can be marketed by individual households or groups of them 
without vehicular transport. In part due to high perishability, but also due to natural 
variation, milk composition and quality is variable and often not easily ascertained. 
This implies costs for monitoring milk quality and potential losses by traders, 
processors, and consumers when milk is spoiled or adulterated. The lack of easily 
measurable quality standards may also allow agents purchasing raw milk from 
producers to reject milk without just cause when they have contracted to purchase 
more milk than can be profitably sold2 . 
Finally, raw milk can be transformed into numerous products, such as butter 
and cheese, and often this is performed by producer households themselves. Such 
processing increases the value per kilogram of finished product and lengthens the 
time before spoilage. This reduces transport and storage costs, even if the returns 
per kilogram of fresh milk input are lower. On the other hand, price differentials for 
quality tend to be higher for processed products. Butter and cheese production is 
in fact typically a reflection of the lack of availability of marketing outlets for raw milk, 
and a reflection of the high transactions costs of milk marketing. 
B. Difficulties in Observation 
Perhaps the limited empirical evidence on the nature and importance of 
transactions costs for East African dairying is due to a number of conceptual and 
measurement difficulties. First, when transactions costs are high enough to prevent 
exchanges from occurring, by definition the costs cannot be obseNed because no 
transaction exists. A related issue is that the nature of transactions costs for 
"obseNed" transactions is likely to be different than that for "prohibitive" transactions 
costs. If policy inteNentions are to be designed to promote entry by producers into 
certain activities that are not currently undertaken (by lowering the associated 
transactions costs), obseNed transactions costs may not provide much of a guide. 
In addition, obseNed transactions costs may not provide a full measure of the 
opportunities for dairy development under alternative institutional or organizational 
structures. For example, if producers limit milk production in response to market 
outlet risk, thereby limiting their exposure to such risk, the nature of obseNed 
transactions costs due to market outlet risk may be small, but the behavioral 
implications of market outlet risk for overall production may, in fact, be large. 
Costs associated with organizing and enforcing institutions of exchange are 
inherently difficult to document. Even transactions costs that are, in principle, 
obseNable may often be designated as "overhead" in firms maintaining records of 
such costs. Finally, accurate assessment of obseNable transactions costs and their 
behavioral implications implies a significant commitment of resources for data 
2 There is anecdotal evidence that the parastatal Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
(KCC), a designated buyer of last resort that has generally lost money in recent 
years, engages in such practices. 
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collection. This is due to the need to examine all agents (not just producers) in what 
are often diverse marketing channels, simultaneously and for a period of time 
sufficient to capture inter-seasonal variation in costs and marketing decisions. To 
date, few if any studies have provided detailed empirical evidence on the nature and 
implications of transactions costs, even for producer households. 
The few extant studies dealing empirically with transactions costs have instead 
attempted to infer the magnitude of transactions costs, based on the observed 
behavior of participating and non-participating agents in the marketing channels 
(Goetz, 1992). When detailed data on transactions costs themselves are not 
available, a reasonable first step is to look for evidence of lack of commercialization, 
as evidence of "prohibitive" transactions costs. Tell-tale signs are an activity 
involving significant numbers of producers and for which imports of the product are 
sold, but for which a low percentage of domestic production is commercialized.3 For 
dairying in Africa, the evidence of behavioral implications of transactions costs is 
clear. Only a small portion of African dairy production is marketed. In Ethiopia, 
which has significant per capita milk production, only 5 percent of estimated national 
production was commercialized in the early 1990's (Staal, 1995). In Kenya, the 
African country with the largest number of smallholder dairy producers selling milk 
off-farm, estimates of commercialization in 1990 range from 43-48 percent (Table 
2 and Jaffee, 1995). Visits to Central Province in Kenya by the authors in early 
1996 confirmed that even when producers can sell "morning milk,,4, the "evening 
milk" 
3 This is consistent with the conceptual framework in de Janvry, Fafchamps and 
Sadoulet (1991), in that the existence of transactions costs stemming from 
imperfect factor markets makes the production item (milk) non-tradable. Producers 
are then less responsive to external markets through production of the item. 
Instead adjustment to relative price changes occurs either in the labor market or 
linked product markets, such as food. 
4 Many smallholder dairy producers in Kenya milk twice a day. "Morning milk" is 
from the morning milking, "evening milk" is from the evening milking. 
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Table 2: Evolution of Selected Characteristics of the Dairy Industry in Kenya, 
1979-1990. 
Smallholders 
and Pastoralists 
Medium-scale 
Farmers 
Large-scale 
Farmers 
Total or 
Average 
Total producti
1979 
1990 (est) 
on (millions of liters) 
769 193 
-------------------1 ,577--------------­
196 
253 
1,158 
1830 
Percentage c
1979 
1990 (est) 
onsumed at home or fed to calves 
57 33 
--------------------- 66 ---------------­
8 
8 
44 
57 
Percentage s
1979 
1990 (est) 
old to KCC (Dairy Parastatal) 
11 25 
------------------25-------------------­
81 
81 
20 
33 
Sources and caveats: Data for 1979 are from Jaffee (1995) and are from Kenya's 
Integrated Rural Surveys 1976-1979. Estimates for 1990 are heuristic, and are 
based on estimates in Republic of Kenya (1993) and anecdotal accounts. 
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often must be consumed at home or sold at a lower price. Estimates for several 
other countries in West and Central Africa range from 25 to 40 percent of milk sold 
off the farm (Metzger et aI., 1995). 
It seems likely that smallholder farmers consume a higher percentage of their 
milk production than do larger farmers. This is borne out by the sketchy evidence 
available for Kenya (Table 2). These stylized facts are consistent with the view that 
smallholders face higher transactions costs in milk marketing than do larger 
farmers, but further study would be needed to better document this conclusion. 
The magnitude and impacts of transactions costs can also be inferred from 
the milk marketing behavior of producers of various sizes in differing locations. 
Debrah and Anteneh (1991) show that larger dairy producers tend to sell relatively 
more to institutional clients--hotels, restaurants, government--than do small 
producers (Table 3). Similar results can be observed in coastal Kenya (Staal and 
Mullins, forthcoming). Selling directly to institutional clients may allow larger 
producers reduce other transactions costs such as searching, monitoring, 
bargaining, etc. Debrah and Anteneh (1991) also suggest that--other things equal-­
proximity to collection point (within 3 km) is more important than proximity to final 
market in explaining participation in dairy markets (Table 4). 
Larger producers are by definition "collection points" of a sort, and thus may 
benefit from milk collection costs lower than those for smallholders. Furthermore, 
the way that transactions costs affect institutional and organizational structures, 
although little explored empirically for dairying in Africa, can be partially examined 
through observed marketing arrangements. For example, the issue of proximity to 
collection point in explaining participation in dairy cooperatives comes up time and 
again in East Africa.5 In sum, there is evidence from a number of countries that 
suggests that both smallholder and large-scale dairy producers face transactions 
costs, but they are of different levels, and they influence production and marketing 
behavior in a manner detrimental to efficiency and equity. 
C. Approach to the Case Studies 
In the remainder of this paper, we further document the importance of 
transactions costs in smallholder dairying in East Africa using data from recent 
Most recently in a reconnaissance mission by the authors in March 1996 to 
Uganda. 
5 
8 
8 
10
 
Table 3: Distribution of 1985 Wet Season Milk Sales for Dairy Producers8 in the 
Addis Ababa Milkshed. 
Market Outlet Large Producers Small Producers 
( percent of total sales) 
Individual consumers 26 91 
Hotels and restaurants 39 o 
Government institutions 35 9 
Averages from 16 large and 16 small producers. 
Source: Debrah and Anteneh (1991). 
Table 4:	 Average Daily Sales of Dairy Products per Dairy Cow by Smallholder 
Farmers in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, July 1986. 
Producer Producers (N=16) Producers (N=16) 
Distance from 0-20 km from Addis Ababa 20-85 km from Addis Ababa 
Collection Milk All Dairy Milk All Dairy 
Center (km) 
(liters sold per cow, liquid milk equivalents8 ) 
0-3 km 0.74 2.06 1.78 1.78 
3 -10 km 0.12 1.81 0.05 1.09 
Other dairy products sold include butter and cheese; calculations assumes that 
1 kg butter requires 24 liters of fresh milk and that cheese output is a by-product of 
butter-making. 
Source: Calculated from Debrah and Anteneh (1991). 
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surveys of dairy cooperatives in Central Province, Kenya, and of dairy producers in 
the Addis Ababa, Ethiopia milkshed.6 In the absence of direct estimates of the 
transactions costs incurred by economic agents in the dairy marketing chain, we 
discuss the indirect evidence of the nature and behavioral implications of 
transactions costs for milk-producing households. Our guiding hypothesis is that 
the influence of transactions costs can be explored through differences in observed 
marketing costs, marketing channels used, costs of inputs (including the capital 
necessary for entry into dairying), and prices received for milk and dairy products. 
The role of organizations in reducing transactions costs is explored through 
differences in the prevalence of dairy cooperatives, and resultant differences in 
dairy marketing patterns, in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
To the extent possible, we explore the additional hypothesis that smallholder 
producers face higher transactions costs in dairy production and marketing than do 
larger producers. The existence of this phenomenon raises the questions as to how 
both sectors can co-exist over time in the same market, the extent to which policy 
interventions have created the dualism, and whether the dualism is desirable. 
IV. TRANSACTIONS COSTS IN DAIRY MARKETING IN KENYA 
In Kenya, 93 percent of urban milk supply in 1992 was handled by dairy 
cooperatives (FAO, 1993). Developed mainly since independence and with 
substantial state support, dairy cooperatives playa critical role in enabling the 
participation of smallholder producers in the formal urban milk market. In principle, 
dairy cooperatives serve to reduce transactions costs facing individual producers 
through pooling risk, lowering unit collection costs, making inputs available, and 
enhancing bargaining power. For processors, cooperatives may lower raw milk 
acquisition (search) costs and make milk supplies more reliable. Raw milk from 
cooperative members is transported (usually by the farmer or a farm household 
member) to nearby collection points. Milk is then delivered by the cooperatives to 
private buyers or collection centers or plants belonging to the Kenya Cooperative 
Creameries (KCC). Although registered as a private limited company, the KCC is 
effectively a parastatal (Grosh, 1991; Jaffee, 1995). Prices paid to cooperatives by 
the KCC are set by the government, are subject to major political considerations, 
and are uniform throughout the large highland collection area that extends for more 
than 300 kilometers from Nairobi, the main center of urban milk demand (Leonard, 
1991 ). 
The KCC is mandated to act as "buyer of last resort", so as to provide a 
guaranteed market outlet for smallholder producers. Until 1992, the KCC had a 
monopoly on fluid milk sales in urban areas. Although no detailed study of the issue 
The Addis Ababa case study draws heavily on the data and insights in Staal 
(1995). 
6 
12
 
exists, the provision of stable prices and market outlets by the KGG most likely 
reduced price and market outlet risk for smallholder dairy producers. The resulting 
lower search costs, and lower risk to smallholders who invested in specialized dairy 
production probably contributed to the success of smallholder dairying in Kenya, 
although withdrawal of KGG's monopsony on milk procurement is a key element of 
future progress (Jaffee, 1995). 
In recent years however, KGG's financial performance has been severely 
compromised by pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing policies adopted for 
political reasons (Grosh, 1991 and personal communication). In Kenya as in most 
of Africa, rainfall and pasture are seasonal. Milk production in the dry season is 
consequently dependent on purchased feeds, which raises costs. Pan-territorial 
procurement pricing appears to treat producers in different parts of the country 
equally; pan-seasonal pricing appears to treat those organized for industrial milk 
production with concentrate feeding equally per liter of milk output with smallholders 
using cut forages. In fact, it meant that KGG was forced to pay relatively high 
procurement prices when milk is abundant in the rainy season, leading to a glut of 
processed milk products in cold storage, and to be faced with a shortage of willing 
suppliers in the dry season, when retail milk prices are higher (Ibid.). 
The squeeze on KGG's balance sheet has resulted in a number of dramatic 
changes affecting the nature and magnitude of transactions costs for smallholder 
dairy producers in Kenya. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the milk prices paid 
by the KGG to cooperatives and subsequently to producers did not keep pace with 
increases in input prices. This was also due to inefficiency in the KGG's collection 
and processing operations, in addition to political considerations regarding prices 
of milk to consumers. Most importantly, payments by the KGG to cooperatives for 
milk supplied were delayed, sometimes for months. In return, cooperatives were 
forced to delay payments to producers, who were subsequently faced with higher 
risks and irregular cash flow. Producers began to shift more sales to the informal 
raw milk market, in spite of higher variation in both the availability of a market outlet 
and prices, incurring the search costs required to locate new buyers. Supplies to 
the KGG fell and, coupled with poor rainfall, in 1991 produced dramatic shortages 
of processed dairy products in urban areas. Encouraged by donors, in 1992 the 
Kenyan government liberalized the dairy industry, revoking the KGG's monopoly on 
urban milk sales (Staal and Shapiro, 1994). 
Although the liberalization applied only to sales of processed milk in urban 
areas, with raw milk sales still officially illegal, it was interpreted differently by milk 
producers, processors, and traders. By many, liberalization was taken to mean that 
all manner of milk market transactions were permitted. As a consequence, the 
period since 1992 has seen the rapid development of a variety of milk market 
innovations, mainly in raw milk markets. These include "self-help groups" which 
collect and market raw milk. These are not registered as cooperatives and so 
unconstrained by restrictive cooperative laws. Emerging private market 
intermediaries now fulfill the same role. Further, dairy cooperatives themselves, 
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once an integral part of the formal KCC milk collection system, are marketing a 
greater proportion of their milk raw to urban markets. 
The growth in raw milk marketing by cooperatives can be seen as a response 
to the continued uncertainty of milk payments by the KCC. Producers regularly 
report that their primary complaint is not the price paid, but the delays in payment. 
To avoid the payment delays that characterize the present KCC collection system, 
producers and cooperatives must incur the costs of searching for alternative market 
outlets, and the related costs of screening, bargaining, and monitoring contractual 
agreements with individuals and firms that are new to them. Some, such as self­
help groups, may require collective effort to establish themselves. In this new 
environment, the search for outlets providing reliable payment has implied 
considerable uncertainty to many producers and cooperatives. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that a number of cooperatives are uncertain about the quantity of milk they 
will be able to market on a given day, which illustrates that smaller marketing units 
introduce a different set of complications compared to the omnipresent parastatal. 
Cooperative members say that they often must market milk on public transportation 
(which they describe as unreliable for their purposes), and lack the savings or credit 
to buy cooling or transportation equipment. Further study of the magnitude of these 
transactions costs, and of appropriate policy responses to this environment of 
greater uncertainty, thus appears merited. 
A survey of private dairy cooperatives in three districts of Central Province 
provides additional evidence on the impacts of transactions costs in dairy marketing. 
Transportation costs, and the related issues of time required to transport milk to 
cooling centers and resultant milk quality, imply that the ability of private 
cooperatives to market milk outside of KCC channels is limited by access to the 
Nairobi market. A survey of 30 dairy cooperatives carried out in early 1996 
(Owango et ai, 1996) assessed changes in cooperative operations since 1990.7 
Kiambu district borders Nairobi, with its center only some 25 kms from the city. 
Thika and Muranga districts are further afield, centered 50 and 80 kms away, 
respectively. Data were collected on amounts of milk marketed to the KCC and 
other outlets by sample cooperative members in each district, and prices paid to 
cooperative members for milk. Alternative market outlets that have grown in 
importance in the three districts include direct sales to individuals, sales to market 
intermediaries, and to private dairy processors making mainly non-liquid milk 
products. Of these, sales to individuals are the most important.8 Kiambu, the 
closest district to Nairobi, exhibited a dramatic decline in the share of output going 
7 This was a joint study by the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARl), and 
the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), and is the source of data for 
this section. 
8 Sales to individuals constituted on average 45 percent of Kiambu cooperative milk 
sales in 1995, and 27 percent in Muranga. 
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to the KGG, whereas in Muranga, the most distant, KCG's share of sales declined 
only marginally. Thus proximity to Nairobi may be an important determinant in the 
decision to sell to KCC, as would be expected in the case of parastatal procurement 
where prices are not fully set by market forces. 
Transactions costs are likely to rise more quickly with distance from the urban 
market than do straight-forward transport costs, due to risks associated with limited 
information about distant marketing outlets, and the increased costs of screening, 
bargaining with, and monitoring distant trading partners. The approximate costs per 
liter of transporting milk by self-help groups in Thika were calculated by the authors 
to be KSH 0.03 per liter per kilometer. Thus, milk transported a distance of 80 
kilometers would incur transport costs of KSH 2.4 per liter, or more than 20 percent 
of the KGC price. Muranga cooperatives continue to sell most of their milk to the 
KCC at KSH 11 per liter, whereas raw milk sales in Nairobi and other urban areas 
in the districts obtain a minimum of KSH 15 per liter. Transportation and search 
costs that rise rapidly with distance most likely explain much of this choice of market 
outlet. These transactions costs are related to the high perishability of raw milk, 
which reduces time available for marketing, and raises risks of spoilage with 
distance. In the case of the more distant Muranga cooperatives, the transactions 
costs necessary to obtain higher prices in urban markets appear be greater than the 
losses imposed by the uncertainty and delay of KCC payments. 
These same factors can be seen at work in a comparison of changes in real 
milk prices paid to producers by the cooperatives surveyed during 1990-1995.9 
Real prices rose most significantly in the two districts (Kiambu and Thika) closest 
to Nairobi. These price increases are primarily due to increased sales by Kiambu 
and Thika cooperatives to alternative raw milk outlets. Thus, some cooperatives 
appear able to at least partly offset the increased transactions costs implied by new 
marketing opportunities with higher prices for their product. 
Both price and market outlet changes observed among peri-urban Kenyan 
dairy cooperatives indicate the important role of transactions costs in determining 
marketing behavior. Importantly, these changes began with a policy reform, that of 
liberalization of the dairy market. Although many of the impacts were unintended, 
this liberalization permitted market actors to avoid uncertainty due to the KCG. As 
a result, cooperatives began to explore alternative market outlets, but only in the 
regions where transportation and other transactions costs permitted. Further 
market reform that formalizes and finalizes the still-tentative reform of dairy 
marketing channels is likely to create more reliable demand by non-KCC 
processors, and therefore larger milk collection areas. 
9 Prices to producers are set based on prices received, cooperative costs, and a 
capital levy. Nominal prices were deflated using average annual CPI changes 
reported by the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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V. PERI-URBAN AND URBAN DAIRYING IN THE ADDIS ABABA MILKSHED 
Dairying in the Addis Ababa milkshed in Ethiopia offers an additional 
opportunity to examine the potential effects of transactions costs on the structure 
of dairy production and marketing. Most milk and dairy product marketing in 
Ethiopia occurs through the informal sector, and so is subject to market forces. Few 
large farms or collective marketing organizations exist, so production and marketing 
costs reflect the dispersed and small-scale nature of dairy sector organization. Dairy 
producers in the Addis Ababa area can be classified into two types: urban 
producers operating "backyard" dairy units, and peri-urban producers operating in 
a mixed crop-livestock system. 
Peri-urban producers in the Addis Ababa milkshed are generally based within 
households whose primary economic activities are agricultural. The use of animal 
traction and accompanying traditions of animal husbandry allows improved dairy 
animals to be incorporated into existing agricultural practices. Major crops in the 
area include wheat, barley, lentils, and oats. In some areas of lower elevation, the 
traditional Ethiopian grain teft (Eragrostis te~ can be found. A minority of producers 
live in or near small towns and also pursue wage labor. Even those producers in 
small population centers generally have access to agricultural land. In addition to 
land allocated to households, communal grazing land is available to some 
producers. 
Urban producers are defined as those who live in the greater Addis Ababa 
area and have no access to agricultural land. They use zero grazing or semi-zero 
grazing practices, depending on the level of street-side grazing employed. They 
tend to rely more heavily on the income from their dairy activities than do peri-urban 
producers. Milk is produced in "backyard" operations, utilizing space available in 
residential compounds. Compounds are not generally designed or enlarged 
specifically to accommodate dairy production. Cattle sheds typically are simple 
structures of corrugated metal sheeting or mud and wattle and floored with blocks 
of stone. Aside from milk sheds, fixed inputs are minimal, including a few buckets 
and milk cans, a water barrel, and brooms. Larger urban producers may possess 
a water pump and a sprayer for application of pesticides. 
A. The Survey 
A survey of dairy operations was carried out in two rounds during 1992 and 
1993; producers were asked to describe the activities of their dairy farms within the 
previous 12 months. Nine survey sites were selected, five within the city limits of 
Addis Ababa. The other four were within 60 km. of the city. Regional clusters were 
averaged and subjective reliability indicators were computed based on enumerator 
measurements and recall items; the 231 respondents were then ranked for 
"reliability" and the bottom third of the "reliability" distribution were eliminated (see 
Staal, 1995). Besides the geographic division between peri-urban and urban, which 
attempted to incorporate the main dairy systems known to operate in the milkshed, 
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the distribution of herd sizes in tropical livestock units (TLU=450 kg live weight) 
showed two distinct modes in terms of herd size, in both the urban and peri-urban 
samples. The two locational samples were then statistically clustered into "small" 
and "large" ex post. 10 Sample characteristics are shown in Table 5. 
The analysis that follows is based on responses from 77 small urban 
producers, 44 small peri-urban producers, nine large urban producers and six large 
peri-urban producers. Although the large producer samples are small, with only 131 
large urban producers and 46 large peri-urban producers reported operating in the 
Addis Ababa area, the samples represent 7 percent and 13 percent, respectively, 
of the total populations. 
Large producers in both urban and peri-urban locations tend to have about 7 
times as many dairy cows as small producers. Large-peri urban producers also 
have sizable herds of non-dairy cattle. Both large and small producers use cross­
bred dairy cattle, and large producers, not surprisingly, use considerably more hired 
labor, especially in urban areas. 
Table 5:	 Sample Characteristics (Means) for Dairy Producers Surveyed in the 
Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992-1993. 
Farm Characteristic	 Peri-urban Urban 
Large Small Large Small 
Number of operations	 6 44 9 77 
surveyed 
Persons in household	 11.2 8.2 9.1 8.0 
Land operated (ha)	 11.3 3.7 
Hours of hired labor	 710 244 616 75 
used/month 
Crossbred or purebred dairy 15.4 2.5 14.3 2.3 
cattle (head) 
Local cows (head)	 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Total herd (head)	 17.5 3.0 14.3 2.3 
Source:	 Producer survey carried out by Steven Staal and reported in Staal 
(1995). 
10 The clusters were based on the minimized sum of squared distances between 
the cluster means. 
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The largest amount of marketed milk is produced by small producers - 73 
percent of milk marketed. Although 6,813 small producers with crossbred dairy 
cattle were identified in 1993 by the Addis Ababa Dairy Producers' Association, only 
177 large producers existed. 11 
B. Dairy Marketing 
The sources of average dairy and dairy-related revenues and costs differ 
between small and large producers, and between urban and peri-urban producers 
of the same size (Table 6). There is considerable variation in the importance of 
marketing outlets depending on scale of production and location. The remarkable 
feature of the urban liquid milk supply, however, is the fact that 88 percent of all milk 
is supplied as raw milk through the informal market. The parastatal collection 
system, the Dairy Development Enterprise (DOE), handles only 12 percent of urban 
milk supply, despite decades of government and donor efforts to expand its 
presence.12 
Besides sales to the DOE, which only occur in peri-urban areas, important 
market outlets include direct sales to individual customers, sales to hotels, 
restaurants, retailers, and traders. The lowest average prices are paid by the Dairy 
Development Enterprise (DOE), the dairy parastatal, followed by sales to 
restaurants and hotels. Individuals pay the highest average prices for raw milk. 
Large peri-urban farmers receive 44 percent of their dairy revenue from milk 
sales to the DOE. The DOE operates a system of milk collection and cooling 
centers (typically at 5-kilometer intervals) along the major roads radiating from the 
capital. Farmers transport their morning milk to the collection centers spaced along 
the road, where milk is weighed and tested for adulteration. Records of milk 
supplied are kept, and payment is made monthly. In addition to its role as a buyer 
of last resort, the DOE plays a role in provision of dairy inputs, especially feed. 
Large peri-urban producers reported a desire to sell milk to the DOE, despite its 
lower price, because in the past this helped ensure access to concentrated feeds 
at subsidized prices. Larger producers professed a belief that diverting sales to 
other outlets would undermine their 
11 The association was formed by the large producers, and is thought to include all 
of them. 
12 The DOE operates a collection system in the peri-urban area along major roads 
leading out of the capital. The milk is processed as sold primarily as packaged, 
pasteurized milk in the urban area. The operations of the DOE are heavily 
subsidized. 
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Table 6:	 Income from Various Market Outlets Received by Large and Small Peri­
urban and Urban Dairy Producers in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992­
1993. 
Market outlet, Peri-urban Urban 
revenues or costs Large Small Large Small 
( percent of total income) 
Own consumption of milk (%) 9.1 12.3 3.3 8.5 
Milk sales to dairy parastatal 43.8 17.6 0 0 
Milk sales to individuals 12.3 15.7 29.5 42.7 
Milk sales to hotels, 11.6 35.0 65.9 36.9 
restaurants 
Cheese and butter sales to 3.6 15.8 0 1.0 
private institutions and 
individuals 
Income from cattle sales 19.6 3.7 1.4 10.8 
(culling, etc.) 
(EB/MT) 
Total revenue 1,174 1,126 1,145 1,188 
Total costs 955 968 610 1,069 
Net returns 219 158 535 119 
Source: Staal (1995), Appendices C, D and unpublished data. 
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access to feeds available only through linked-transaction arrangements with the 
DOE. 
Feed subsidies through the DOE are being discontinued as part of overall 
parastatal reform. Further, sales at low prices to the DOE suggests supply in 
excess of demand in alternative (informal) markets. This "surplus" exists in spite of 
the fact that many peri-urban producers selling to the DOE are located within 20 
kms of the center of Addis Ababa. In Kenya this proximity to the urban center would 
be considered ideal for marketing directly to urban consumers. 
Unlike in Kenya, for a variety of historical and policy reasons, dairy 
cooperatives are essentially non-existent in Ethiopia.13 In the absence of 
alternatives to the DOE for collective marketing, dairy marketing behavior close to 
urban areas is strongly affected by individual transactions costs faced by individual 
producers. Partly as a consequence of this, 68 percent of urban milk supply was 
estimated to come from producers operating inside the urban area, and in close 
proximity to consumers (Staal 1995). Small peri-urban producers sell only about 20 
percent of their milk production to the DOE. They are able to obtain higher prices 
for their remaining milk through sales to individuals and businesses in small 
population centers. 14 Hotels and restaurants in peri-urban areas constitute points 
of small but steady demand. Small peri-urban producers rely more than any other 
group on home processing of milk, primarily into butter, which is then sold to 
traders. This allows excess production to be conserved and transported, avoiding 
some transactions costs due to spoilage or forced consumption, and improves upon 
the low returns available through sales of small quantities to the DOE collection 
centers. 
Direct sales by producers to individual and institutional consumers, by­
passing the dairy parastatal and private middlemen, constitute the bulk of milk sales 
in the Addis Ababa milkshed, comprising 70 percent of total milk marketed. Post­
farm processing activities playa relatively small role overall. 
As a result of this, direct sales normally involve an informal contractual 
arrangement, whereby a producer agrees to supply a certain quantity of milk daily 
to the consumer. The price is then agreed on a Ethiopian Birr/liter /month basis for 
milk supplied daily, and payment is made monthly. The milk is either delivered by 
the producer or collected by the consumer. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these 
13 See Staal 1995 for a description of the evolution of the dairy industry in Ethiopia. 
14 Sales to individuals also allow the opportunity for adulteration of the milk with 
water, which is more difficult in the case of DOE sales, which are tested. The 
resultant uncertainty about milk quality may result in additional transactions costs 
for consumers, and therefore affect overall demand for fluid milk. 
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contracts are inflexible; consumers report that they cannot easily buy more or less 
milk if their needs change. However, the contracting system appears to be adapted 
to the seasonality of production and consumption15. 
The higher prices obtained from sales to individuals attract most small urban 
production, and much of large urban production. Small producers supply quantities 
most appropriate for individual direct sales, their most important outlet. Large urban 
producers' main outlet, however, is through sales to hotels and restaurants, which 
constitute stable demand for their greater output. In sum, both producers and 
consumers of dairy products in the Addis Ababa area appear to be put a premium 
on contracting with only a small number of clients\suppliers, suggesting that 
transactions costs are especially high in open milk markets. 
C. Milk Prices Received 
The average milk prices received reported by peri-urban and urban dairy 
producers during the survey period averaged EB/liter 1.03 for individual sales in the 
peri-urban area and EB/liter 1.64 in the urban area. The DDE paid 1.00 EB/liter, a 
price that is set administratively. Prices received for raw milk sales by different 
producer groups are shown in Table 7. There is a notable difference between 
small and large producers in prices received for hotel and restaurant sales, in both 
urban and rural areas. The price that hotels and restaurants paid to small urban 
producers is significantly less (p<0.01) than the price paid to large producers. This 
price is also less than the price available from sales to individuals by either group.16 
This price discount affecting sales by small urban producers can be perceived as 
the cost to them of not being able to supply a larger quantity of milk (which may be 
only 5-10 liters/day) on a more reliable basis to businesses that require a reliable 
supply. This "cost" 
15 In Ethiopia, dairy products are not consumed by Coptic Christians--roughly half 
the popoulation--during the lenten fasting season. This has a major impact on 
market outlets for dairy products and on dairy prices in the period before Easter. 
16 Given the lack of a significant difference between prices received by large and 
small producers for sales to urban individuals, and also relative to prices paid by 
institutions to large urban producers, the range 1.60-1.65 EB/liter can be considered 
a competitive retail price in urban areas. 
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Table 7: Average Raw Milk Prices Received, by Market Outlet and Producer 
Type and Location (EB/liter). 
Producer Type Individuals Hotels and Other outletsa DDEb 
Restaurants 
Large Peri-urban 0.95 (n=3) 2.00 (n=1) NA 1.00 
Large Urban 1.63 (n=5) 1.60 (n=3)** 1.54(n=3) NA 
Small Peri-urban 1.05 (n=14) 1.30 (n=3) 1.22 (n=5) 1.00 
Small Urban 1.65 (n=49) 1.35 (n=10)** 1.21 (n=6) NA 
** Significantly different from each other (small and large urban) at (p<0.01)
 
a Other outlets include retailers, traders, etc.
 
b DOE prices were administratively set at 1 EB/liter.
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averages EB 0.25 per liter in the urban area, some 15 percent of the mean price of 
sales to individuals. This price difference can also be taken as a direct estimate of 
the cost that the small producer is willing to accept to sell milk to a presumably 
more reliable contract buyer. In this case, hotels and restaurants may be acting as 
"market outlets of last resort". Thus this price difference provides an estimate of 
transactions costs particular to small producers due to the absence of alternatives 
to the DDE collection system. Notably, no price difference in evident for individual 
sales that are composed of smaller transactions (often 1-2 liters). 
Factors explaining why producers of an ostensibly homogenous product would 
repeatedly accept substantially lower prices in the same location and season from 
one buyer compared to another can be investigated more formally with the data 
from the producer survey. The price reported by respondents as the typical price 
they accepted from a given outlet (institutional, retail, etc.) in a given season is 
regressed against several characteristics of the producers in question and several 
characteristics of their dairy marketing operations, exclusive of whom they were 
selling to. These producer and transaction characteristics are independent of the 
type of outlet selected by the producer. In a perfectly competitive market, all outlets 
would pay the same price for the same good. In the market studied, different 
producers faced different levels of transactions costs, depending on asset and 
information levels, season and location. They responded to these differential 
transactions costs by differential sales strategies. 
The model regresses price accepted from a given outlet against farm 
characteristics such as dummy variables for season and location of farm, 
continuous variables for farm herd size, annual rental value of land operated by the 
producer, daily hours typically required for milk delivery from the farm, and 
transaction characteristics such as the typical cash cost of marketing milk to this 
outlet, average daily milk sales to outlets of this type, and a dummy variable 
whether this outlet is a regular customer of the farmer. Results for a variety of 
disaggregations are shown in Table 8. 
The "daily cash cost of milk marketing" and "daily hours of milk delivery" 
variables tend to be collinear, which may account in part for the low significance 
observed. When "cash cost" is dropped for the peri-urban sample alone, where 
remoteness is more of an issue, the time required to market milk is significantly 
negatively associated with the price that farmers can get for their milk. This 
suggests that farmers located further away from Addis have significantly less 
attractive options for disposing of their milk. 
Otherwise, almost all other coefficients are statistically significant at 10 
percent or better, and of expected sign when the high cost of moving milk over 
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Table 8: Determinants of Producer Prices of Fresh Milk in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992-1993 
(dependent variable: average milk price received in EB/liter per producer and type of outlet). 
Variable Pooled Across Locations Pooled Across Pooled Across Seasons 
Season/Location 
Rainy Season Dry Season Urban Periurban 
Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
Intercept 0.943 (16.2) 0.790 (10.1) 0.806 (16.1) 1.109 (26.1) 0.999 (6.7) 
Dummies on the Intercept 
Urban producers 0.344 (8.5) 0.355 (6.3) 0.354 (10.5) 
Rainy season sales - 0.112 (4.2) 0.117 (3.8) 0.085 (1.8) 
Non-contract sales 0.084 (1.8) 0.095 (1.6)' .093 (2.5) 0.107 (2.8) -0.091 (-0.7)' 
Continuous variables 
Herd size -0.012 (-4.4) -0.007 (-2.1 ) -0.009 (-4.3) -0.000 (-0.1)' -0.014 (-4.2) 
Daily milk sales to that 
type of outlet (It/day) 
0.009 (3.8) 0.09 (3.2) 0.008 (4.8) 0.006 (2.9) 0.015 (1.6)' 
Daily cash cost of 
marketing to that type 
of outlet (EB/day) 
-0.009 (-0.2)' 0.107 (1.6)' 0.038 1.02' 0.033 (0.9)' - Note 2 
Daily hours used in 
milk delivery 
-0.013 (-0.5)' -0.50 (-1.4)' -0.030 (-1.3)' -0.031 (-1.4)' -0.304 (-2.25) 
Rental value of land, 
including urban 
compounds (000 EB) 
0.012 (5.2) 0.008 (2.8) 0.010 (5.5) 0.007 (3.7) 0.013 (3.7) 
No. observations 102 96 198 142 56 
R2 0.65 0.50 0.58 0.39 0.44 
Notes: (1) Not significant at 10 percent. 
(2)	 "Cash costs of milk marketing" and "Daily hours used in milk marketing" were collinear in the small 
periurban sample. "Cash cost" was therefore dropped in the periurban regression. 
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distances with poor infrastructure is considered. Urban producers typically received 
a significantly and substantially higher price, other things equal, confirming the 
results in Table 7. Despite the greater availability of milk in the rainy season, prices 
accepted were higher then. This seems to be due in part to greater difficulty in 
delivering milk from rural areas to the city during the rainy season, as evidenced by 
the stronger seasonal effect for the urban sample as compared to the peri-urban 
one. 
Another clear trend in the results are that a pattern of selling a relatively larger 
amount of milk to the outlet in question tends to be positively associated with 
receiving a higher per liter price, eet. par. This reinforces the view that consumers 
are willing to pay more for adequate supplies from a given source. On the other 
hand, farmers received less per liter on regular sales to the same source, 
suggesting again that farmers were prepared to forego income for a regular outlet. 
Finally, once these other effects are netted out, farmers with a higher level of capital 
(proxied by the rental value of land and installations operated) per animal 
(accounted for by herd size) still tend to receive higher payments per liter. This is 
clear evidence that relative availability of assets (capital intensity) is associated, eet. 
par., with being able to secure a higher price per liter for milk. 
D. Revenues and Costs 
The average revenue per metric ton of milk in the survey was remarkably 
similar across producer types. However the unit cost for large urban producers was 
remarkably lower than for other types of producers. Thus the unit profit for large 
urban producers was 4.5 times as high as for small urban producers and 2.5 times 
as high as for large peri-urban producers. When average production levels are 
taken into account, large urban producers made a profit in 1992-93 of more than 
US$2,500, whereas small urban producers earned less US$70 net from dairying. 
Large peri-urban producers earned US$700, and small peri-urban producers netted 
about US$110. 17 
The cost structures per ton of milk produced are shown in Table 9. Land 
costs are obviously different between peri-urban and urban producers. In fact, other 
evidence suggests that the land rents or opportunity costs incurred by peri-urban 
producers were considerably in excess of their social values, in view of policies that 
restrict access to land (Staal, 1995). Small peri-urban producers were able to 
substitute pasture and labor for feed purchases. Table 9 shows 
17 Profit calculations include "normal" returns to land, labor and capital, based on 
current opportunity values estimated for each group of producers. Positive profits 
may thus be considered "above normal" profits. 
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Table 9: Cost Structures of Large and Small Producers in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992-1993 (EB/MT Milk 
Produced). 
Cost Category 
Feed 
Land 
Fixed inputs except 
animals 
Family labor 
Hired labor 
Veterinarian/AI 
services 
Marketing 
Dairy animals 
Utilities 
Total 
Peri-urban Urban Difference 
Large (PL) Small (PS) Large (UL) Small (US) PL-PS UL-US 
439 321 317 561 118 -244 
209 328 24 92 -119 -68 
92 47 95 73 44 22 
13 55 14 74 -42 -60 
67 92 52 84 -25 -33 
47 27 23 27 20 -4 
41 40 16 . 31 1 -15 
32 39 24 62 -6 -38 
13 18 45 64 -5 -19 
954 968 609 1,068 -14 -459 
Source: Staal (1995), Appendix C. 
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the differences in cash values of inputs for large and small-scale producers. It is 
clear that the cost advantage of large urban farmers per ton of milk stems in large 
part from lower per unit feed costs, despite not having pasture land. The differences 
in feed costs per kg are largely due to a policy of cheap disposal of edible industrial 
by-products, which impacts primarily in the city, and primarily on larger producers. 
However, it should be noted that economies of scale were also evident in land use 
and labor use. The latter dwarfed economies of scale in marketing costs, veterinary 
costs, artificial insemination cost, utilities and unattributed economies of scale due 
to herd size. 
Large farms required about 7 times more capital (based on amortized annual 
costs) per farm than small farms in peri-urban areas and 8 times more capital than 
small farms in urban areas. On a per cow basis, large farms are still 15 to 30 
percent more capital intensive than small ones. On a per liter basis, large peri­
urban farms are the most capital intensive and the small peri-urban farms the least 
capital intensive. 
The large per farm capital cost differences illustrate the potential for credit 
market imperfections to limit entry into large-scale dairy production. Formal credit 
is only available to those with existing collateral, which is constrained because land 
is not privately owned. Formal credit applications also require submission of 
detailed investment plans that may be beyond the skills and resources of many 
dairy producers. Informal credit is available through rotating savings societies 
(idder) , but the amounts available are small relative to capital needs for dairying. 
Credit availability, combined with the capital intensive nature of large-scale dairying, 
could partially explain the predominance of small-scale production. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence available from Kenya and Ethiopia about the role of transactions 
costs in smallholder dairy marketing is largely indirect and anecdotal, rather than the 
result of detailed direct observation of transactions costs. Nevertheless, certain 
hypotheses are compelling. First, transactions costs in east African dairy are high, 
as evidenced by the low percentage of milk production that is commercialized in 
Kenya and Ethiopia, compared to that in developed countries. 
Second, the size of the dairy operation, and its proximity to urban markets, 
influence the products and market channels used by producers to market dairy 
products. Transactions costs increase with distance, most likely faster than 
transportation costs alone, due to the increased costs of information and risk of 
dairy product spoilage before a buyer is found. The prices received by producers 
also decrease with distance and appear to vary considerably depending on the size 
of sales and the flexibility of contractual relationships between producer and 
consumer. Smaller producers in the Addis Ababa milkshed appear to receive lower 
prices than larger producers in some marketing channels. All producers appear to 
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be willing to accept lower prices in exchange for a reliable outlet. Further, small 
producers may incur greater transactions costs per unit of milk sold than large 
producers when both sell to the dairy parastatal that serves as a buyer of last resort. 
Finally, empirical analysis on the Ethiopian data shows that even when other 
producer characteristics and transaction characteristics are accounted for, 
producers with a higher degree of capital intensity per cow tend to be able to secure 
higher prices per liter than those with a lower capital intensity. This is indicative of 
an underlying explanation of differential transactions costs faced by different 
producers: differential access to assets (and probably to differential information), 
which may translate into greater market clout. 
The role of organizations of collective action (such as processing parastatals, 
cooperatives, "self-help" groups, etc.) in reducing transactions costs is a recurring 
theme in smallholder dairy development in East Africa. When effectively managed, 
such organizations reduce transactions costs for both the producers and the buyers 
of dairy products. This reduction in costs typically is due to economies of scale in 
collection and transport, and also because organizations reduce the need for 
information about widely dispersed and small-scale buyers and sellers. 
Kenya's experience with a parastatal processing company as a buyer of last 
resort seems to indicate that a full-fledged government intervention such as KGG 
can lower transactions costs during the start-up phase of smallholder dairy 
development. Over time, however, political pressures begin to affect the parastatal, 
particularly with regard to pricing policies. As a result, producers, cooperatives, and 
private processors began to face higher transactions costs than necessary to take 
advantage of market opportunities through the KGG. Attempts to circumvent this 
problem by private parties appear to have led to attempts by the parastatal to 
prevent competition from alternative institutional arrangements. 
Comprehensive policy recommendations require a more detailed study of the 
structure and determinants of transactions costs and their impacts on the behavior 
of economic agents. However, the evidence already available suggests a number 
of policy implications. First, because of the potentially important role of collective 
organizations in lowering transactions costs in dairy marketing, government actions 
to provide an enabling environment of regulations, enforcement and infrastructure 
for well-managed cooperatives, self-help groups, and private enterprises would 
promote smallholder dairy development. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, a more 
supportive environment for collective action in the dairy sector would involve 
reduction in the bureaucratic obstacles to effective formation and management of 
cooperatives. 
In both countries, government intervention in cooperative formation and 
decision-making appears to transcend that necessary to protect cooperative 
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members and their customers18. It appears that governments can productively 
intervene to support the flow of information (about market opportunities and prices, 
for example) to dairy marketing organizations, to provide resources for training in 
management and planning of their decision makers, and under appropriate 
circumstances, to support greater access to credit for capital expenditures identified 
by the organizations as priorities (vehicles and cooling equipment, for example). 
Another action that appears necessary to support smallholder dairy 
development is greater transparency of dairy marketing policies, and greater 
consistency in their implementation. In Kenya, greater transparency is likely to be 
required with regard to fluid milk marketing by private processors in urban areas. 
The 1992 liberalization has yet to be finalized, perhaps discouraging investment and 
marketing activities by private dairy companies, including producer-based 
cooperatives. Ethiopia's policy concerning privatization of state dairy farms and the 
dairy parastatal has yet to be made definitive. 
The implications for researchers are perhaps the most clearly defined. 
Despite agreement that transactions costs have potentially large impacts on market 
integration, and therefore development in general, few studies exist that document 
the level and determinants of transactions costs. The nature of transactions costs 
renders a full accounting of their nature and impacts difficult. Yet opportunities exist 
to better document transactions costs that are, in principle, observable. These 
observable transactions costs include: the opportunity costs of time spent by 
producers in marketing, direct transportation and processing costs; losses due to 
spoilage resulting from uncertain market outlets; and the degree to which market 
outlets used by producers change over time (resulting in additional search costs). 
Costs incurred by producers for transactions to obtain inputs, especially feed, credit, 
land, and labor, may have especially important impacts and also deserve detailed 
study. 
Finally, a comprehensive study of transactions costs in dairy marketing would 
account for transactions between numerous agents in dairy marketing channels, 
including producer decisions to sell milk to more than one buyer, often under quite 
different contractual terms. Perhaps what is most needed is methodological 
development with regard to conceptualization of transactions costs and how to 
measure them. Research on household and sub-sector models that beUer integrate 
both existing transactions costs, but also the institutions and contracts that govern 
individual transactions, would be beneficial in a broader sense. Such models would 
18 For example, in Kenya, all expenditures over KSH 5,000 (currently about $100) 
must be approved by the District Cooperative Officer, and approval of the Ministry 
of Cooperative Development is required to appoint and dismiss key cooperative 
management positions. In Ethiopia, government agencies are reputed to have 
claimed ownership of dairy processing equipment purchased by groups of 
producers under dairy development projects. 
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not only provide improved policy insights for dairy development, but ultimately would 
promote the well-being of rural smallholders by improving their ability to respond to 
an ever-changing economic environment. 
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